The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Intellectual Property Journal

Akron Law Journals

March 2016

Legal Interpretation by Computer: A Survey of
Interpretive Rules
Eric Engle

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Engle, Eric (2011) "Legal Interpretation by Computer: A Survey of Interpretive Rules," Akron Intellectual Property
Journal: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol5/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Intellectual Property Journal by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more
information, please contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Engle: Legal Interpretation by Computer

9-ENGLE_MACROED 4.9.11.DOCM

4/12/2011 12:48 PM

LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER: A SURVEY OF
INTERPRETIVE RULES
Eric Engle*

I. Introduction ......................................................................... 71
A. Computers in Law .......................................................... 71
B. The Limits of the Formalism/Realism Dichotomy ......... 73
II. Interpretive Methods............................................................ 75
A. Formalist Rules of Statutory Construction ..................... 75
B. Argumentation: Methods which constrain
Interpretation ................................................................. 89
III. The Computer Program ....................................................... 92
IV. Conclusions ......................................................................... 92
I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Computers in Law

Computers in law have been used to present mainly for computeraided legal instruction (programmed instruction)1 and automated
*

Dr.Jur., M.Sc. (abd), Professor of Law, Pericles-ABLE, Moscow Russia; JD St. Louis; DEA Univ.
Paris; LL.M., Dr.Jur. Universitaet Bremen. Dr. Engle has written several articles on Artificial
Intelligence and Law: An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning: Using Xtalk
to Model the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT 565 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020460;
Smoke and Mirrors or Science? Teaching Law With Computers—A Reply to Cass Sunstein on
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Science, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020461; Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Can
Rico Protect Human Rights? A Computer Analysis of a Semi-Determinate Legal Question, 3 J.
HIGH TECH. L.1 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020470;
Using WYSH Computer Programs to Model: The Alien Tort Claims Act, 6 YALE J. L. & TECH. 161
(2004),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020449&rec=1&srcabs=1020460,
which
contains extensive descriptions of the state of play in computer modeling of law including links to
other scholars working in this field.
1. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Teaching Artificial Intelligence to Law Students, 3 LAW TECH. J. 3
(Oct.
1994),
available
at
http://www.buscalegis.ufsc.br/revistas/index.php/buscalegis/article/viewFile/5268/4837 (discussing
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research2 (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis). Computers can, however, also be used
for representing legal decision-making.3 This article presents a survey of
legal interpretive rules. The rules presented in this survey are used as
the rule base in the computer program accompanying this article, an
expert system.4 The computer program models legal decision-making
and uses the rules presented to make legal decisions, generating a report
to justify the decision reached. Legal interpretation is chosen as a model
for computation representation because understanding interpretive
methods is useful for any jurist seeking creative arguments. This survey
of legal interpretive rules is of both a theoretical and practical interest.
Theoretically, this survey shows that, while the formalist/realist
dichotomy is sometimes useful, sometimes it breaks down: certain
interpretive methods could be characterized at times as either formalist
or realist. Formalists argue for classical methods of logic such as
induction and deduction using bright line tests. In contrast, “realists”
argue for flexible “standards,” policies and teleology to guide the law.
Other similar dualistic splits exist:
between originalists and
interpretivists, in constitutional law; between holists and monists;
between cognitivists and skeptics; and other paired opposites that
express various philosophical schisms, such as epistemological realism,
or noetic eidetic reality, versus epistemological materialism, or
empiricism. However, as the formalism/realism split is best documented
and most influential, at least in contemporary American legal
scholarship, the article focuses on it as a representative type of the sort

the methodological problems involved, especially the problems of developing syllabi for teaching
law and AI).
2. See, e.g., Sandip Debnath et al., LawBOT: A Multiagent Assistant for Legal Research, 4
IEEE
INTERNET
COMPUTING
ONLINE
(Nov.-Dec.
2000),
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=895013&tag=1 (requires subscription); see,
e.g., Jeffery S. Rosenfeld, Nuts & Bolts: Legal Research, THE ADVOCATE (Md. State Bar Ass'n
Young Lawyers Section), Fall 2002, at 3 (discussing the benefits of automated research tools such
as Eclipse and Westclip).
3. See generally John Aikin, Computers and Human Reason, WASH. ST. ASS'N OF DATA
PROCESSING MANAGERS NEWSL., Info. Processing Mgmt. Ass'n, Olympia WA, July 1, 1977
(reviewing JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT TO
CALCULATION (W.H. Freeman & Co. 1976) (discussing the use of computers to automate judicial
decisionmaking), http://www.ipma-wa.com/news/1977/197707.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
4. Previous efforts at developing artificial intelligence for law have also focused on expert
systems. See G. Greenleaf, A. Mowbray & A.L. Tyree, The Datalex Project, International
Conference
on
Artificial
Intelligence
and
Law
(1987),
available
at
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=41737; James Popple, Shyster, Australian National University,
available at http://cs.anu.edu.au/software/shyster/; JAMES POPPLE, A PRAGMATIC LEGAL EXPERT
SYSTEM (1996), available at http://cs.anu.edu.au/software/shyster/book/.
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of meta-theoretic debates which apply to determine the selection of a
legal interpretive method.
The program accompanying this article presents the jurist with a
series of questions, and from those questions determines a legal
outcome. This shows that automated decision-making is possible, even
in abstract cases where we are not dealing with substantive legal rules
but rather with “meta-rules”: rules for deciding rules. Computer
modeling of law can serve as a diagnostic tool and memory aid, forcing
the jurist to consider possible arguments she might otherwise omit by
reminding them of some of the more obscure general points of law that
may not be immediately addressed in the relevant cases in her area of
specific practice. Formalization of the law by computer also forces
jurists to explicit enthymematic premises, revealing otherwise
weaknesses in their arguments, or their opponent’s. Thus, artificial
intelligence in law can serve practical purposes. This survey is
practically useful since it sets out the various interpretative arguments in
one place. This survey is also theoretically interesting since it shows
that the realist/formalist dichotomy is not always adequate: some legal
interpretive methods can be characterized as either formalist or realist
depending on the facts of the case at bar and judicial fidelity to the rule
of law. This survey is also theoretically interesting because it shows that
the interpretive rules are internally consistent and can be presented as a
formal system and applied by a computer program. The inference
engine developed using this rule base hopefully will serve to inspire
other efforts at modeling law computationally.
B.

The Limits of the Formalism/Realism Dichotomy

This survey reveals the limits of the formalism/realism dichotomy.
An attempt to categorize legal interpretive methods as either formalist or
realist soon breaks down in several regards:
1) Axiologically: Both the realists and their opponents were
moral cognitivists: they believed moral values existed, but
disagreed bitterly about what they were. As a result, moral
cognitivism has been largely replaced by neutral moral
relativism; not because of the strength of relativist arguments,
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but rather due to the mutual exhaustion and opposition of
contending moral cognitivists.5
2) Epistemologically: The formalist/realist split can also be
only partially analyzed as a split between those arguing for
empirical materialism (the realists) as opposed to noetic
idealism (“pure theory”).6 We could describe this split using
the shorthand of “Marx vs. Plato.” However (neo)platonic
noetic theories have more or less been universally abandoned
in favor of materialist arguments, which range from Richard
Posner on the right to Karl Marx on the left. Plenty of
“classical” legal scholars are, like realists, materialists.
3) Politically: We could argue that realists and realist methods
are “left’” and “reform’” oriented in contrast to the “right”
“conservative” methods of formalists. We might thus think
that the realists would embrace arguments allowing the
extension of rules so as to effectuate legal reform, and that the
formalists would adhere to formal logic which would conserve
and apply existing rules. In fact however, many classical
methods of interpretation, such as inductive ampliation, allow
the development of new rules out of old ones.7 Teleological
arguments are as old as Aristotle, yet are considered, at least
here, as “realist” because they enable legal reform by opening
the scope of judicial discretion.
4) Economically: The realist/formalist dichotomy also ignores
reality. Conservative judges have not had much difficulty
adopting economic arguments. Yet economic arguments are
clearly not an element of classical logic, though they are one
form of phronesis, that is practical reasoning. Economic
analysis of the law is in fact a very recent phenomenon. While
we can say that formalists and neo-formalists have had no
trouble adopting economic arguments because they are
conservative, economic analysis is not the monopoly of the
(neo)realists.8 But “policy arguments,” a typical realist
5. Engle, Eric, Artificial Intelligence and Law Using Rule Based Expert Systems (Oct. 21,
2008) (unpublished Master's thesis, Universitaet Bremen) (manuscript at 43), available
at http://etdindividuals.dlib.vt.edu:9090/346/1/msc.doc [hereinafter Engle, Artificial Intelligence].
6. Id.
7. Engle, Eric, Legal Interpretation by Computer: Are Legal Rules Predictable? (Sept. 15,
2008) (unpublished manuscript at 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270073 [hereinafter
Engle, Legal Interpretation].
8. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5 at 44.
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method, are often in fact economic arguments. Similarly,
balancing tests, the flagship of realism, also often reduce to
economic arguments due to the question of how to evaluate the
weights of competing interests.9
Consequently, the interpretive methods could be classified as
either: (1) formalist rules of statutory construction; (2) formalist
methods which constrain interpretation; (3) realist methods of
interpretation that favor development of new legal rules; and (4)
economic and policy arguments. Here, we analyze interpretation
following Savigny’s schema,10 and then try to see if the methods can be
classified as either realist or formalist and conclude they cannot. Some
interpretive methods could be called formalist in some regards, or realist
in others.
II. INTERPRETIVE METHODS
A.

Formalist Rules of Statutory Construction
1. Text
a. Literal or “Plain Meaning” Interpretation

We start this survey by considering the interpretive rules courts
would use in their likely order of application. Since Savigny legal
interpretation is seen as moving from text, to context and structure to
history and teleology, goals and policies of the law, even in U.S. law.11
9. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7 at 7.
10. FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROEMISCHEN RECHTS, 206-330
(1840),
available
at
http://dlibpr.mpier.mpg.de/m/kleioc/0010/exec/bigpage/%22199236_00000256%22; see, e.g., Raul Narits,
Interpretation of Law in the Estonian Legal System, I JURIDICA INT‘L 1996, 11-16, available at
http://www.juridicainternational.eu/index/1996/vol-i/interpretation-of-law-in-the-estonian-legalsystem.
11. In the hierarchy of interpretive tools, of course, the statutory language comes first. Only
when that language is ambiguous is it necessary to examine first the statute's structure and
purpose, and then lastly the legislative history, which is last and least authoritative
because it ultimately matters what legislators do, i.e. enact, not what they say about what
they do. What various legislators say about a statute is often contradictory, unclear,
ambiguous, or merely an expression of one of many competing views of a statute not
necessarily shared by others who voted for it. In some instances, however, as here,
unambiguous, clear, uncontradicted, and specific legislative history can serve as a reliable
interpretive guide.
McDow v. Smith, 295 B.R. 69, 78, n.18 (E.D.Va., 2003).
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Plain meaning arguments state that the law means what it says, nothing
more or less: statutes should be interpreted to implement the will of the
legislator, not the judiciary. Literal or literalist interpretation is a
somewhat pejorative synonym for interpretation according to the plain
meaning of the text. The critique is that plain meaning arguments are
tautological and provide no criteria to determine whether and when a
meaning is “plain.”12 Furthermore, courts are sometimes, in the interest
of justice, willing to ignore the plain language of a statute.13 A court
may reject a literalist interpretation where such interpretation does not
conform to “the circumstances surrounding their adoption, or for that
matter, with the context, subject matter, historical background, effects
and consequences, spirit and purpose, or any other factor to which courts
advert in determining a statute's meaning.”14 Courts sometimes reject
the literalist interpretation for those reasons. A literal interpretation of a
statute is not admissible where it would lead to “an absurd result.”15
This rule is obviously formalist, and is the first line argued in any
statutory interpretation. It is also fairly easily formalized
computationally, as is the case of most formalist arguments. If the plain
meaning of the text resolves the interpretation then we need not look to
other interpretations.

12. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Counterintuitive Consequences of “Plain Meaning,” 33
ARIZ. L. REV. 529 (1991); Michael S. Moore, Plain Meaning and Linguistics—A Case Study, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1253 (1995); Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain Meaning
Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299
(1975); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1057 (1995);
Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and
Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715 (1992); David A. Strauss, Propter Honoris Respectum: Why Plain
Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565 (1997).
13. See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942); see also Director, Office Of
Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Dep’t of Labor v. Perini North River Assoc., 459
U.S. 297, (1983).
14. See Hurley Trucking Co., Inc. v. Arizona, 39 P.3d 527 ¶ 22, (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 29,
2002), rev. denied and ordered depublished, Hurley Trucking v. Arizona, 46 P.3d 408 (Ariz. May
21, 2002) (citing Zamora v. Reinstein, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996)).
15. “Although we must give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, the General
Assembly's intent and purpose must prevail over a literalist interpretation that leads to an absurd
result.” Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1284, (Colo. 2000).However plain the ordinary meaning
of the words used in the statute may be, the courts will reject that meaning when to accept it would
lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature or
would defeat the plain legislative intention. Kiriakids v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 440
S.E.2d 364, 366 (S.C. 1994).
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Maxims of Legal Interpretation

Several maxims of interpretation can be used to determine the plain
meaning of the law.
i. Expressio Unius
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a specific type of
grammatical interpretation.16 It is synonymous with inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius.17 It is a rule of statutory construction. It holds that
“the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.”18
Thus “where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person
to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what
is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.”19
Further, expressio can also be applied to other similar statutes: “explicit
direction for something in one provision, and its absence in a parallel
provision, implies an intent to negate it in the second context.”20 Where
the legislator gives a list of exceptions to a rule that list shall be
considered exclusive.21
However, expressio unius is subject to
legislative intent: where the legislative intent is clearly contrary,
expressio unius will not apply.22 Thus some of the interpretive rules are
explicitly hierarchized, this does not however appear to be the case for
all the interpretive rules.
ii. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus no exceptis
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis (an exception
affirms the rule in cases not excepted).23 This maxim appears to be a
reformulation of expressio unius.24

16. Burgin v. Forbes, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Ky. 1943); Newblock v. Bowles, 40 P.2d 1097,
1100 (Okla. 1935).
17. See Burgin, 169 S.W.2d at 325.
18. Manchin v. Dunfee, 327 S.E.2d 710, 712 (1984); see also Riffle v. Ranson, 464 S.E.2d
763, 770 (W. Va. 1995) (“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention of one thing
implies exclusion of all others)”).
19. People v. Aarons, 305 A.D.2d 45, 51 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (quoting McKinney’s Cons.
Laws of NY, Book 1, Stat. § 240).
20. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. FMSHRC, 895 F.2d 773, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
21. See People v. Municipal Court 574 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1978).
22. See In re Joseph B., 671 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1983).
23. Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS 135, 15, n.2 (1999).
24. See Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Soc. v. Kane, 689 F. Supp. 1164, 1172 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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iii. Ejusdem generis
Where specific words enumerate persons or things, general words
following them are not to be construed in their widest sense but rather
are limited to apply only to persons or things of the same class
specifically mentioned.25 The general words following the specific
words shall be interpreted no more generally than the specific preceding
words.26 Thus ejusdem generis is a type of syntactic argument. In fact it
closely resembles “expressio unius” but appears to refer to contracts
rather than statutes.27
iv. Generalibus specialia derogant
Where two hierarchically rules of law conflict with each other, one
using specific terms, and the other general terms, any conflict in
interpretation resulting is resolved by determining that the special
section is controlling. This is summarized in the maxim Generalibus
specialia derogant (special provisions derogate from general ones).28
Generalibus specialia derogant seems to be a variant of expressio unius.
Similarly, where the special statute is enacted after the general statute,
the applicable maxim of statutory interpretation is 'generalibus specialia
derogant' (special things take from general).29
At an even broader level, “The general principle to be applied to the
construction of acts of Parliament is that a general act is not to be
construed to repeal a previous particular act, unless there is some express
reference to the previous legislation on the subject, or unless there is a
necessary inconsistency in the two acts standing together.”30 Because,
[T]he legislature having had its attention directed to a special subject,
and having observed all the circumstances of the case and provided for
them, does not intent [sic], by a general enactment afterwards, to

25. General Roofing Company v. Borough of Belmar, 187 A.2d 16, 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1962).
26. See U.S. v. LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D.C. N.J. 1976).
27. See id.; Aleksich v. Indus. Accident Fund, 151 P.2d 1016, 1021 (Mont. 1944).
28. See Holloway v. Henderson, 82 So. 344, 345 (Ala. 1919); McFountain v. State, 83 So. 53
(Ala. 1919), and cases cited; Herring v. Griffin, 100 So. 202 (Ala. 1924).
29. See Bank of Montreal v. Signet Bank, 193 F.3d 818, 833 (4th Cir. 1999); Blue Mountain
Serv. Corp. v. Zlateff , 769 P.2d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Brown Paper Mill Co., Inc. v. Commr.
of Internal Revenue, 255 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1958).
30. Ex Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca, 109 U.S. 556, 570 (1883) (quoting Thorpe v. Adams, L.R. 6
C.P. 135 (Bovill, C.J.)).
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derogate from its own act when it makes no special mention of its
intention so to do.31

v. Lex posterior derogat legi priori lex posterior derogat
anterior/lex posterior derogat priori
The maxim “lex posterior derogat priori” states that “between an
earlier and a later law, the later prevails.”32 At first this may seem to be
in conflict with the maxim “expressio unius.” That is not in fact the case.
One argument against the authority of legal maxims is that they are
contradictory.33 However the author's research reveals otherwise.
Several methods at first glance do seem redundant, but not contradictory.
These include Ejusdem generis, Generalibus specialia derogant,
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus no exceptis, and Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, or inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. All appear to
say the same thing: a posterior general statute must be contextualized by
the prior specific statute such that the general instances in the second
statute (or contract, in the case of ejusdem generis) may not be
interpreted more generally than, or in conflict with, the prior statute
absent express legislative intent. The maxim of lex posterior derogat
priori might at first appear to be in conflict with the maxim expressio
unius. But we must remember that just as we read statutes so that they
are not in conflict with each other or with the constitution so must we
also read maxims in that way. Lex posterior states that a later law will
supplant an earlier law.34 It expresses the general case. Thus a true
example of “lex posterior” is the case where the prior law is simply
abrogated completely. Expressio unius is then the special case where the
prior law addresses the subject with specific terms and is followed by a
later statute that expresses the subject in more general terms.35 Further,
this can be seen as a fair interpretation when we see that expressio unius
only applies where no specific legislative intent can be found to overturn
the earlier law.36 Finally, these maxims all serve to implement the
democratically elected legislature and operate according to predictable

31.

Id. at 570-71 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Champneys, 30 Law J. Ch. 782; 2 Johns. & H. 31-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Gouveia v. Vokes, 800 F. Supp. 241, 250-51 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7, at 13.
Id.
Id.
State v. Crawford, 39 185 P.3d 315, 317 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).

54).
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rules of formal logic. Thus, though the maxims do not always have
express hierarchies, such hierarchization can be derived.
vi. Actor Incombit Probari
This argument is merely the statement of the general principle that
the moving party must bear the burden of proof.37 Sometimes, however,
that fact will decide the issue.
vii. Dura lex, sed lex
This maxim is positivist and formalist. It holds that that the law is
the law and must apply regardless of its consequences because the
function of the court is merely to adjudicate and not to make law.38 This
argument will not carry much weight in modern courts.39
2. Context and Structure
a. Syntactic Interpretation/Grammatical Interpretation
If the plain meaning interpretation does not resolve the statutory
argument we must then look to the context and structure of the statute.
Syntactic arguments parse each term of the statute carefully and the
syntactic position of each within the sentence to resolve linguistic
ambiguities.40 For example, does “and” mean “both/and” or merely
“either/or?” Does “or” mean “either A or B, but not both,” or instead
“either A or B, and possibly both?” In other words, must cruel and
unusual punishments be both cruel and unusual to be unconstitutional or
merely cruel or unusual? In syntactic interpretation, the position of the
word within the sentence, punctuation, conjunctions, and any other
syntactic clues are taken as evidence of the legislator’s intent. 41
Syntactic interpretation must not reach an absurd result.42
37. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 98.
38. See In re Cobos, 994 S.W.2d 313, 316 n.3 (Tex. App. 1999) (“The law is harsh, but it is
the law.”).
39. See id.
40. See L. Allen & M. Caldwell, Modern Logic and Judicial Decision Making: A Sketch of
One View, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 226 (1963) (on syntactic argument).
41. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Murphy, 511 N.E.2d 515, 517 (1987).
42. For example, where a counterfeiter argued that a word modified only the word
immediately preceding it and not the entire group of words, the court held through syntactic
argument that the criminal’s exculpatory argument was no valid defence. United States. v. Stanley,
23 F.3d 1084, 1086 (6th Cir. 1994).
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Grammatical arguments likewise parse the sentence structure
looking for clues as to the legislative intent. Here however the focus is
not on individual words and their positions in the sentence but rather on
phrases, clauses, and parts of speech.43 Objections to syntactic and
grammatical interpretation are that they search for a non-existent and
unrealistically precise legislative intent within a statute that was either
badly drafted or even intentionally ambiguous. In the case where the
ambiguity can be shown for political reasons to be intentional, the
judicial function has every right to intervene to clarify the law. Again, if
the context and/or structure of the statute resolve the conflict the
interpretation is unambiguous and we need consider no other arguments.
Syntactic arguments are a literalist form of legal reasoning.
b. Contextual Interpretation/Systematic Interpretation

Contextual interpretations, also known as systematic
interpretation,44 interpret the particular law as an expression of a
general law and thus determine the law according to the superior
hierarchical norm.45 No new rule is inferred; rather the existing
rule is expanded or contracted so that it is congruent with
hierarchically superior norms.46 In systematic interpretation, the

43. J.R. Harris v. Commonwealth, 128 S.E. 578, 579 (Va. 1925).
44.[I]n German jurisprudence, contextual interpretation is called systematic interpretation.
Under this approach, ambiguous words are eliminated by reference to other related
provisions or concepts in which the same word or term appears. For example, if, in
the abortion question, one has to determine whether the term “life” in the
constitution comprises unborn human life, one can search for the meaning of "life"
in other legal texts to discover what protection “life” has received on the
constitutional level. The main goal of contextual interpretation usually is the
furtherance of the consistency and coherence of all relevant legal norms, that is,
legal certainty. If possible, legal terms or concepts should have consistent meanings
in all the places where they are being used. At the very least, their meanings should
not conflict!
Winfried Brugger, Concretization of Law and Statutory Interpretation, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F.
207, 237 (1996).
45. “In systematic interpretation, one attempts to clarify the meaning of a legal provision by
reading it in conjunction with other, related provisions of the same section, or title, of the legal text,
or even other texts within or outside the given legal system; thus, this method relies upon the unity,
or at least the consistency, of the legal world.” Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of
Jurisprudence, and Anthropology 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 395, 396-97 (1994).
46. For an application of the principle of systematic interpretation see Case Concerning
Border and Transborder Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69, 94 (Dec. 20, 1988); Advisory
Opinion No. 13, Competence of the International Labor Organization to Regulate, Incidentally, the
Personal Work of the Employer, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 13, at 23 (cited in Karsten Nowrot, Emily
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legal interpretation is determined not by reference to legislative
intent but squarely within the legal text itself.47
Systematic interpretation of the law is exceptional in the common
law because, for example, “courts are constitutionally limited to resolve
only those issues brought before the bench, a comprehensive, systematic
interpretation of the Loft Law is not to be expected.”48 It is however
more often found internationally. Thus, for example, systematic
interpretation of the U.N. charter interprets a rule “in the general
structure and scheme of the Charter [of the United Nations].”49 The
legal rule is thus determined by comparing it with other rules established
in the treaty or by referring to the entire structure of the treaty.50 Again,
these are forms of structural interpretation.
c. Synthetic interpretation
Synthetic interpretation synthesizes a new rule through ampliation
of existing rules.51 In synthetic interpretation rule one, two . . . to rule n,
whether or not hierarchically equal, imply together a new rule, rule n+1.
Rather than interpreting rule one in the light of rule two through n,
hierarchical interpretation derives a new rule.52
Thus synthetic
interpretations “focus on the aims of the treaty and its institutional
objectives.”53 This is still a form of structural interpretation, but the
most open one and could be characterized for that reason as more realist
than formalist. According to synthetic arguments, we should view the
law in question as one thread in a larger tapestry; the individual law

W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the
Ecowas Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 341 (1998)).
47. [L]ogical-systematic [interpretation]... does not seek to discover the (purely
subjective) intention of the legislator, but rather seeks the logical objective meaning
of the statute, as an expression of the law. According to this second approach, legal
texts have a meaning of their own, implicit in the signs of which they are composed,
and independent of the actual or presumed will of their authors.
Eduardo Garcia Màynez, Introducción al estudio del derecho [Introduction to the Study of Law]
(33d ed., 1982) translated in Robert S. Barker, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 131, 141 (1998).
48. Franmar Infants Wear, Inc. v. Rios, 491 N.Y.S.2d 975, 998, (N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 1985).
49. Certain Expenses of the U.N., 1962 I.C.J 6, 11.
50. “Under the systematic method of interpretation, the meaning of the norm is ascertained
by comparison with other norms set forth in the treaty and by referencing the entire structure of the
treaty.” Nowrot and Karsten, supra note 46, at 341
51. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7, at 10.
52. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 64.
53. MICHAEL H. LANE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE SUPERHIGHWAY. 95-96 (1998).
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cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. Rather we must consider the other
laws flanking it in order to understand the meaning of this law within
that context. Synthetic interpretation can open up the interpretations of
laws that might otherwise be plain facially. For example, reading the
Nineteenth Amendment’s alteration of the Fourteenth Amendment so
that their combined force is to ensure constitutional equality for women
is an exercise in “synthetic interpretation” of the Constitution.54
Namely, the interpreter synthesizes two or more legal texts into a whole,
which in fact may be greater than the each part because those two parts
work together synergistically.55
d. Concretization
Concretization is essentially a principle of administrative law
interpretation according to which the judge takes a function of "filling
gaps" to help realize the legislative scheme for the administrative
agency.56 Concretization views laws, particularly laws which determine
administrative procedures, as foundational bricks and regards the
decisions of administrative courts as being the mortar which fills in the
open texture of the foundational laws.57 Concretization is a form of
structural argument. One judge states:
I view the process of administrative rule-making that sharpens
the line between acceptable and nonacceptable conduct as akin
to what jurisprudence does in concretizing the norms of a
statute by judicial decision-making that addresses itself to
specific case scenarios. The term is derived from Hans
Kelsen's General Theory of Law and State (citation omitted).
Kelsen explained the concept of concretization in the
following passage:
‘From a dynamic standpoint, the
individual norm created by the judicial decision is a stage in a
process beginning with the establishment of the first
constitution, continued by legislation and custom, and leading
to the judicial decisions. The process is completed by the
execution of the individual sanction. Statutes and customary
laws are, so to speak, only semi-manufactured products which

54.
(1989).
55.
56.
57.
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are finished only through the judicial decision and its
execution. The process through which law constantly creates
itself anew goes from the general and abstract to the individual
and concrete.
It is a process of steadily increasing
individualization and concretization.’58
e. Legal Completion (Rechtsergaenzung)/Legal Interpretation
This type of interpretation seeks to cure lacunes in the law by
examining a phrase in the law with respect to that same phrase as
elsewhere defined in the law.59 It is a form of structural interpretation.
3. History (Historical/Genetic Interpretation)
If the text, context, or structure of the statute do not resolve the
interpretive conflict we must then consider the statutory history to see
the legislator’s intent. Historical interpretation examines the legal
history surrounding the creation of the statute in a search for legislative
intent, an example of the will-theory of law.60 The usual argument
against historical interpretation is that the legislative intent is ambiguous
or even non-existent, particularly when the case at bar is one of first
impression and not within the imagination of the legislator at the time
the legislation was enacted.61 Here the interpretation starts to open up.
The historical interpretation could be seen as a legal realist method or as
more literalism depending on how serious the research into discerning
the legislative intent, which may be unclear or conflicted, is taken. It is
less easily generally formalized since the legislative history depends on
each statute in question.

58. Ethics Comm’n v. Keating, 958 P.2d 1250 (Okla. 1998); see also Federal Trade
Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952) (“The right or obligation results not merely from the
abstract expression of the will of Congress in the statute, but from the Commission's completion and
concretization of that will in its order.”); State v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316, 323 (Alaska 1975) (holding
that “absent judicial concretization, the ordinary citizen desiring to comply with the law would be
forced to speculate” about the laws impact on him); In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 321 F.2d
500, 502 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that concretization uses the specific facts of a particular situation
to give appropriate meaning to judicial decisions); United States v. Articles of Drug Labeled
Colchicine, 442 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
59. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7, at 9.
60. “In historical analysis, the interpreter attempts to identify what the founders of a legal
document wanted to regulate when they used certain words and sentences; here, both the specific
and the general declarations of intent are of crucial importance.” Brugger, supra note 45, at 397.
61. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 62.
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4. Teleology “Realist” Methods of Interpretation that Favor
Development of New Legal Rules
The following arguments can be considered “realist” as many of
them, such as probabilistic reasoning, have only come to be accepted in
the last century and further because they tend to “open up” the
interpretation to allow application to new cases or even to create new
As such they are more difficult to model
rules altogether.62
algorithmically, but nonetheless are tractable.
a. Probabalistic Reasoning
The classical problem in torts of probabilistic reasoning occurs
when we have several potential tortfeasors and a definite victim of an
instrumentality common to all tortfeasors. For example, consider three
manufacturers of a carcinogenic product, and it is unknown which of the
three produced the defective product in the case at bar.63 The idea is to
argue that each potential tortfeasor should be held proportionally liable
according to market share, even though causation cannot be proven, to
avoid the absurd result of non-liability that would otherwise occur. This
is sometimes referred to as “market share liability.”64 Probabilistic
arguments are also made in cases of multiple causation or mutual
causation, for example, in comparative negligence regimes, where the
plaintiff and defendant both partially contributed to the resulting
accident. Probabilistic reasoning looks at stochastic processes in order
to determine what is most likely to have happened.65 For example, if a
plaintiff has 90% of the market share of a product, say asbestos.66 The
defendant suffers from injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos. A
probabilistic argument would hold that, if the actual source of the
asbestos could not be proven, due, say, to multiple exposure to various
potential sources over several years, then the defendant should be held
liable in proportion to the likelihood that their product caused the injury.
Supposing that there was an 80% likelihood that the injury was in fact
caused by asbestos. Then the defendant would, using probabilistic
reasoning, be liable for 72% of the damages to plaintiff (90% of 80%).

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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Thus the strength of the argument is proportionate to its probability.67 A
probabilistic proof need not, as illustrated above, be 100% certain.
“Proof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial evidence need
not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient
if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the
probability of the existence of the material fact.”68 Inferences are
determined as valid or not depending on whether the inference is “so
unreasonable as to be unjustifiable.”69 That is, an inference may be
merely supported by the evidence and does not need to be compelled by
the evidence as the only possibility.70 Juries are permitted to “chain”
several inferences into a series of inferences leading to a conclusion
which would not be supportable if the inferential chain’s elements were
viewed separately.71 A jury is free to make inculpatory as well as
exculpatory inferences.72 This method could be seen as formalist
because the market shares are determinate or as realist since it is not a
clear bright line test that will lead to a certain foreseeable result.
b. Comparative Argument
The essence of comparative argumentation is that the courts of this
jurisdiction should be willing to compare the decisions of other
jurisdictions in making their determinations as to what the law is or
should be.73 For example, in Geddes Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S.
Supreme court considered decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights in reaching the decision that criminalization of homosexual acts
was unconstitutional.74 The Supreme Court also used comparative
method in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd to determine the interpretation
of the French words “lésion corporelle” in a treaty to which the U.S. was
a signatory and in which French was the official language.75 Similarly
the Pinochet cases in Britain cited extensively to U.S. decisions as

67. Goldhirsh Group, Inc. v. Alpert, 107 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997).
68. State v. Copas, 746 A.2d 761, 782 (Conn. 2000) (citing Service Road Corp. v. Quinn, 698
A.2d 258 (Conn. 1997)); accord Pierce v. Albanese, 129 A.2d 606 (Conn. 1957).
69. State v. Ford, 646 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1994).
70. Copas, 746 A.2d at 782.
71. State v. Crafts, 627 A.2d 877, 882 (Conn. 1993).
72. See State v. Stanley, 613 A.2d 788, 792 (Conn. 1992).
73. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 75.
74. 539 U.S. 558, 560, 573 (2003).
75. 499 U.S. 530, 536-547 (1991), see also Eric Engle, European Law in American Courts:
Foreign Law as Evidence of Domestic Law, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 99, 104 (2007), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hela/Europa/Foreign.htm.
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persuasive evidence of British law as to immunity, comity and other
common law doctrines relevant to international law.76 It can be
characterized as a realist method because it opens the scope of
interpretation to judicial discretion.
c. Teleological Argument (also called logical interpretation)
Once text, context, structure, and history are exhausted
interpretation looks to the ends, or goals, of the law. Teleology, also
known as final causality,77 is the idea of Aristotle that objects contain
within themselves the blueprints of their own ultimate development. For
examples, the teleology of an acorn is a mighty oak; the teleology of a
boy is a man. Legal teleology argues that law serves intermediate ends
as means to the ultimate end of justice,78 whether distributive, also
known as “geometric” or “social” justice,79 or commutative, also known
as “arithmetic” or “transactional” justice.80 A teleological argument of
criminal law would hold that the purpose of a criminal law is not merely
to deter and punish but also to correct so that the criminal reaches their
full human potential. Teleological arguments have appeared, for
example, in areas of law as diverse as equal protection jurisprudence and
banking law.81 Teleological argument can trump literal arguments.82
Teleological argument could be considered realist in that it leaves a large
scope to judicial discretion.
d. Multi-Factor Interest Balancing Tests
One of the preferred methods of legal realist jurisprudence is multifactor interest balancing tests.83 In such tests the court weighs the
interests of all relevant parties, not necessarily merely the interests of the

76. See Eric Engle, Alien Torts in Europe? Human Rights and Tort in European Law, ZERP
Discussion Paper, DP 1/2005, available at http://works.bepress.com/eric_engle/23.
77. Book Review, John Courtney Murray And The American Civil Conversation 10 J.L. &
RELIGION 589, 594 (1993/1994).
78. U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1497, 1500 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
79. See Aristotle, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V. (c. 350 B.C.).
80. Id.
81. Kite v. Marshall, 661 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1981).
82. Fidelity Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 689 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir.
1982).
83. See James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test
Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 773 (1995); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987).
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plaintiff and defendant.84 The court then determines the relevant weight
of these various interests and then determines which group of interests is
predominant and uses this preponderation to determine whether and how
the law applies.85 Multi-factor interest balancing tests, however, can be
easily manipulated and thus suffer from the same critiques made by
realists of the methods of formalism! The ambiguity in weighting
factors can be rendered objective by use of economic arguments. This
partly explains the rise of law and economics in U.S. jurisprudence.
e. Economic and Policy Arguments
i. Economic Argument
Economic arguments are extremely popular in the United States
“[T]he common law is best explained as if the judges were trying to
maximize economic welfare . . . . Common law adjudication brings the
economic system closer to the results that would be produced by
effective competition–a free market operating without significant
externality, monopoly, or information problems.”86 One can criticize
law and economics as suffering from reductionism, for it reduces
complex transactions to one fungible standard, money. Of course in fact
not all transactions are fungible. Not all values are quantifiable, nor is
there a market for all possible transactions. Thus, the reductionist
position of economic arguments can lead to theoretical absurdities.87
Naturally, there is a place for qualified economic arguments, namely
where those arguments are contextualized by other values that are not
transferable or quantifiable. However the singular success of economic
arguments in the United States has led to a commodification of law
which ignores non-market values causing injustice and was probably in
no small part the result of the collapse of the idea of objective morality
due to competing versions of morality posited by realists and formalists
undermined simultaneously by moral relativists claiming to be following
the ideas of Hume and Nietzsche.88

84. See, e.g. Rhode v. Adams, 957 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Mont. 1998).
85. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 76.
86. RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, p. 4-5 (1981).
87. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 78.
88. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ANTICHRIST; BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL. See DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Book III, Part I, § 1.
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ii. Policy Arguments
Arguments from policy are a sort of teleological argument and can
be seen as realist in that they open argument to judicial discretion.
Policy arguments look at the goals served by the laws in order to
interpret the meaning of the law.89 However, if policy arguments are to
avoid question begging then we need to determine what the exact policy
or policies are that justify the interpretation. Legal certainty, judicial
economy, conservation of scarce resources, preservation of a free
market, and the encouragement of the production of wealth are all
examples of broad ranging policies used to guide interpretation of law.
B. Argumentation: Methods which constrain Interpretation
Realist and interpretivist methods tend to open up interpretation to
allow creative lawyering and judging; formalist and originalist
arguments reduce the possible range of applications of a legal rule.
Rightly or not, just as realism is seen as left wing, formalism is seen as
conservative.
1. Deductive Argument (Syllogism)
Deductive Argument reasons from general principles to specific
instances.90 For example, the statute provides a general rule and the
specific facts of the case are argued as fitting the rule. In common law
courts that is about the extent of deductive argument, and indeed, courts
sometimes make errors in logic.91 However, in civil law courts
deductive reasoning plays the principle role. In civil law courts it is
possible to argue deductively from generally recognized principles of
law to determine outcomes in specific cases.
2. Bright Line Tests
Bright line tests are merely “either-or” binary tests of a sort
“either guilty or innocent” dependent on fixed objective indicia.92 To a
realist, they are the perfect example of elevating form over substance. To

89. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 78.
90. People v. Martinez, 51 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Colo. App. 2001).
91. For an example of clearly erroneous misapplication of the U.S. federal appeals court see,
Miller v. Champion Enterprises Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 679 (6th Cir. 2003). The court in Helwig v.
Vencor, 251 F.3d 540, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2000) makes the exact same error!
92. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7, at 15.
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the formalist, they are the bulwark of the rule of law, for law must be
foreseeable to be valid both in the sense of its own legitimacy and in the
sense of an effective admonition to potential law-breakers prior to the
fact. All of the rules of statutory construction described above can be
considered to be “bright line tests.”
3. Analogical Argument
Arguments by analogy hold that the decision in case A should
apply to case B because cases A and B have several facts in common
and the points which they do not have in common are essentially
irrelevant to the applicability of the decision. The argument of analogy
is that likes should be treated alike. However:
Logicians teach that one must always appraise an analogical
argument very carefully. Several criteria may be used: (1) the
acceptability of the analogy will vary proportionally with the number of
circumstances that have been analyzed; (2) the acceptability will depend
upon the number of positive resemblances (similarities) and negative
resemblances (dissimilarities); or (3) the acceptability will be influenced
by the relevance of the purported analogies.
For Appellants to draw a proper analogy, they had the burden in the
district court, as they do here, of showing that the similarities in the facts
of the two cases outweigh the differences.93
4. Reductio ad absurdam Proof
Reductio arguments are elegant and powerful in simplicity but in
the author's opinion, and that of some courts, are somewhat risky as they
depend on the truth of all presumptions in the argument.94 Essentially,
an argument by reductio presumes the opposite of what is to be proven,
and shows that that presumption leads to a logical impossibility, in

93. See In Re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 305 F.3d 145, 157 (3d. Cir. 2002) (citing Irving
M. Copi & Keith Burgess-Jackson, Informal Logic 166 (3d ed. 1996)); see Arthur L. Goodheart,
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 179 (1930); JOHN H. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE’S CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT LAW 118 (3d ed. 1942); JOHN
STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 332-33 (8th ed. 1916) (“Two
things resemble each other in one or more respects; a certain proposition is true of one; therefore it
is true of the other.”).
94. “Reductio ad absurdum arguments frequently are untrustworthy, and this one should be
examined with care.” Cf. J. Parreco & Son, 567 A.2d 46 (D.C. 1989) (warning against judicial
overeagerness to invoke the “absurd result” doctrine as a guide to construction).” Richardson v.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310, 352 (D.C. 2003) (dissent).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol5/iss1/4

20

Engle: Legal Interpretation by Computer

9-ENGLE_MACROED 4.9.11.DOCM

2011]

4/12/2011 12:48 PM

LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY COMPUTER

91

theoretical terms, or to an absurdity, in practical terms.95 Vulgar forms
of this argument can be criticized as conclusory, merely asserting that
the position of the opponent ludicrous. However, well-formed reductios
grant the opponent’s major premise but show that that premise entails a
conclusion that is either logically impossible or practically ridiculous.
That is the risk of the reductio: one grants an opponent's premise, an
undesirable move generally, but here as a gambit. If the gambit
succeeds the argument is won. If it fails, it will likely be lost, although
arguing in the alternative may save the day.
5. Inductive Argument
Arguments by induction, the principal engine of common law
reasoning, are similar to arguments by analogy.96 Inductive logic,
reasoning from particular instances to general rules, is the opposite of
deductive logic, which is reasoning from general rules to particular
cases.97 Both are admissible forms of reasoning in the common law,
though deduction generally corresponds to statutory law and induction to
case law.98
In an inductive ampliation we infer a general rule to govern a series
of similar cases from the fact that that series of cases had both a similar
rule and similar facts.99 Sometimes the common law is presented as
being ampliative. Inductive ampliation and reasoning by analogy are
similar but not the same. In ampliation we infer a new rule from an
existing set of cases and rules. In reasoning by analogy we apply the
rule in one case to determine the rule in another case due to their factual
similarity.100 No new rule is inferred in the case of reasoning by
analogy, unlike inductive ampliation.

95. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 72.
96. The engine of the common law is inductive reasoning. It proceeds from the particular to
the general. It is an experimental method which builds its rules in tiny increments, caseby-case. It is cautious advance always a step at a time. The essence of its method is the
continual testing and retesting of its principles in “those great laboratories of the law, the
courts of justice” (Smith, Jurisprudence, p. 21).
Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 409 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1980).
97. Dunn v. State, 454 So.2d 641, 646 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
98. “[E]vidence can be either direct or circumstantial; that we can establish truth via
inductive reasoning, as well as by deductive reasoning.” Wilson v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. 739
So. 2d 802, 802, (La. Ct. App. 1998) (Fitzsimmons, concurring opinion).
99. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 73.
100. See United States v. Tapia, 309 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2002); In Re Linerboard Antitrust
Litigation, 305 F.3d 145, 158 (3d. Cir. 2002).
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III. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM
The rules exposed above are used as a rule base for a computer
program to model legal decision-making that accompanies this article.
The computer program serves as a sort of legal compendium, a checklist
if you will, not of various forms to be made out but rather of arguments
that could be made. The computer program applies algorithms that
determine the strength of the argument to be computed. The strength of
the argument can either be predetermined by the user or by comparing
the facts of the case to the conditional that triggers the rule. If the
conditional that the rule expresses is satisfied then the method will be
applicable and will determine the likely outcome of the case. The
program limits itself to the practical legal question whether a legal
method would or would not apply. The program only implicitly
considers the theoretical debates discussed in the paper as part of the
structure of the source code of the program. To do otherwise would
make the program open-ended, and thus less determinate and of
questionable use in practice. Further, such considerations would require
a great deal of effort for little tangible reward in terms of scientific
explanations and predictions of the law. Finally, that would take an
already somewhat ambitious program and threaten it with greater
complexity, larger file size, and would essentially bring it outside the
range of a law review article.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This survey shows that economic thought pervades AngloAmerican legal discourse. It also shows that the law is fundamentally
conservative: not merely through burdens of proof weighing against
moving parties, but also in the economic evaluation of the weight to be
affected to different variables used to represent particular legal methods.
Seeing the extent and limits of modeling law by computer reveals the
extent of objectivity in the law.
Individual legal methods can be readily formalized, while the
choice of which legal methods to apply are less so. Thus, that aspect of
legal interpretation was not modeled. Interpretive rules are decidable,
self-consistent, hierarchically structured, and at times defy the
formalist/realist dichotomy. Formalist rules are easiest to model
computationally, because the results are most predictable; the lament of
“mechanical jurisprudence.” However, realist rules can also be
modeled, and modeling them reveals the enthymematic presumptions of
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realism. We see clearly the problem of multi-factor interest analysis
when we ask ourselves exactly which factors are chosen and then what
weights are to be given to the varying interests. Courts generally “duck”
the question of exactly how they weight the interests. When pressed,
they tend to rely on economic evaluation as an objective metric for
weighting of interests. Economic theories, due to quantification, lend
themselves well to computational modeling, however teleological ones
do not since goals are abstract. Modeling policy considerations is only
possible very generally and abstractly and does not lead to an algorithm
that generates a certain definite outcome across a broad class of cases.
Nevertheless, the self-consistent hierarchical nature of interpretation
enables the elaboration of the clearest and simplest rules. First, black
letter “plain meaning” arguments, then grammatical and structural
arguments, followed by historical arguments seeking legislative intent
and finally, at the most abstract level, teleological/policy arguments.101
The formalist/realist dichotomy then emerges as a spectrum with the
initial arguments as most formal, and the final arguments as most realist;
though the study shows the dichotomy is not always apt, it also reveals
the spectral character of that dichotomy.

101. “Savigny distinguished, in modern parlance, textual, verbal or grammatical interpretation,
systematic, structural or contextual interpretation, and historical interpretation.” Brugger, supra
note 45, at 396-97.
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